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INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of res judicata sets forth rules that determine the
preclusive effect former judgments have on subsequent litigation.1
This doctrine dates back to at least thirteenth-century Europe, and its
name has roots in the Latin phrase “res judicata pro veritate accipitur,”
which translates to “a matter adjudged is taken for truth.”2  The pri-
mary aim of res judicata is to prevent parties from relitigating matters
already decided in previous adjudications.3  This serves to preserve ju-
dicial resources, prevent repetitive litigation, and, most importantly,
ensure the finality of previous judgments.4  “Finality is an important
goal in litigation.  Piecemeal and seemingly endless litigation imposes
a financial burden which people can ill afford.  Voltaire, for instance,
remarked that he was financially ruined but twice.  Once when he lost
a lawsuit.  Once when he won one.”5  Therefore, determining the ap-
plicability of res judicata, and thus finality, is an important question in
the American judicial system.
Res judicata encompasses both issue preclusion—also known as
collateral estoppel—and claim preclusion.  Claim preclusion prevents
“multiple suits on identical disagreements between the same parties,
which would lead to courts determining the same controversy twice.”6
Issue preclusion, by contrast, is narrower in scope and requires “later
courts [to] honor the first [court’s] holding regarding an issue that
has actually been litigated.”7  Today, it is almost universally held in
both federal and state courts that the application of res judicata is a
question of law for the court (i.e., the judge).8  When determining
whether res judicata applies to a given case, the judge will resolve mat-
ters such as whether the current suit involves the same parties or par-
ties in privity with the original parties and whether the person against
whom preclusion is sought had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue in the first action.9  Having the court answer such questions,
however, should alarm litigants as the court is usurping questions that
are inherently fact-bound and should instead reach a jury.
1 See Walter W. Heiser, California’s Confusing Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion) Doc-
trine, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 509, 509 (1998).
2 See ALLAN D. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION 19 (1969); Barbara Andersen
Gimbel, The Res Judicata Doctrine Under Illinois and Federal Law, 88 ILL. B.J. 404, 404 (2000).
3 See VESTAL, supra note 2, at 16. R
4 See Yuval Sinai, Reconsidering Res Judicata: A Comparative Perspective, 21 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 353, 361–62 (2011).
5 Gimbel, supra note 2, at 404 (quoting Torcasso v. Standard Outdoor Sales, Inc., 626 R
N.E.2d 225, 230 (1993)).
6 Monica Renee Brownewell, Note, Rethinking the Restatement View (Again!): Multiple
Independent Holdings and the Doctrine of Issue Preclusion, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 878, 883 (2003).
7 Id.
8 See infra note 14. R
9 See infra Part I.A–B.
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For centuries, federal and state courts have adhered to the six-
teenth-century mantra of Lord Coke: “[j]udges decide questions of
law; juries decide questions of fact.”10  A question of fact involves the
determination of whether acts or events actually occurred or whether
certain conditions existed, whereas a question of law applies legal
principles to a particular set of facts.11  Given this fact-law distinction,
it seems puzzling to deem res judicata as a question of law for the
judge.  When determining the applicability of res judicata, what hap-
pens when a litigant alleges that she was not given a full and fair op-
portunity to litigate in the first action?  If the other party refutes this
allegation, is this not a disputed issue of fact that needs to be resolved
by the jury?  Yet judges make these determinations every day by classi-
fying them under res judicata’s “question of law” umbrella.12  How-
ever, this was not always the case.
Examination of res judicata cases from the nineteenth century
reveals that courts required the jury to determine whether res judicata
applied to a given case.13  But in the twentieth century, the jury’s role
began to diminish as the duty to determine the application of res judi-
cata migrated from juries to judges.  By the second half of the twenti-
eth century, it was almost universally accepted that res judicata was a
question of law for the judge.14  Without thoughtful analysis or rea-
soned discussion, courts moved a factual inquiry that was once well
established within the jury’s duties to a purely legal decision for the
judge.  In fact, this migration was so slow and subtle that the courts
never even saw the need to overrule the cases holding res judicata as a
question of fact.
This Note asserts that there was no legal justification for res judi-
cata’s migration from a question of fact to a question of law.  Account-
ing for state and federal jurisprudence on the role of judge and jury,
this Note proposes that there is a right to have a jury hear factual
disputes regarding the application of res judicata and that the courts’
modern-day practice of giving these matters to the judge is
unconstitutional.
The significance of preserving the jury’s role in civil trials is para-
mount in the American judicial system.  The Supreme Court once
10 See J. Wilson Parker, Free Expression and the Function of the Jury, 65 B.U. L. REV. 483,
485 & n.7 (1985) (quoting Townsend’s Case, 75 Eng. Rep. 173, 178–79 (K.B. 1554)).
11 See Nichole Biglin, Note, Enablement: For the Judge or the Jury? Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc.’s Analysis Applied, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 145, 146 (2003).
12 See infra note 14 and accompanying text. R
13 See infra note 75. R
14 See, e.g., McKinney v. City of East St. Louis, 188 N.E.2d 341, 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963)
(“The defense that the prior judgment was not binding on the city raised a question of law,
not submissible to a jury.”); Agnew v. Union Constr. Co., 291 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Mo. 1956)
(“Ordinarily the issue of res judicata is a question of law.”).
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summarized the jury’s importance by stating that “[m]aintenance of
the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so
firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtail-
ment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost
care.”15  The lack of a legal justification for the evisceration of the
jury’s role in res judicata disputes certainly does not demonstrate the
level of scrutiny the Court envisioned.  Curiously, virtually nothing has
been written on this issue.  This void might exist because scholars, in
their focus on whether or not res judicata as a whole violates the right
to a jury trial,16 overlooked whether the process for determining res
judicata’s applicability impermissibly bypasses the jury.
Part I of this Note outlines the procedure for how modern judges
determine whether res judicata applies to a given case.  Part II exam-
ines American jurisprudence regarding the right to a jury trial and the
fact-law distinction.  Part III contrasts how courts conducted the appli-
cation of res judicata in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and
shows that there was no proffered legal justification for moving res
judicata from a question of fact to a question of law.  Part IV analyzes
the possibility of res judicata being part of the judicial screening func-
tion.  Finally, Part V proposes a procedure by which courts may dis-
pose of res judicata disputes while still preserving judicial economy
and complying with the constitutional right to a jury.
I
THE PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING THE APPLICABILITY
OF RES JUDICATA
Nearly every state and federal court treats the application of res
judicata as a question of law.17  Because the application of res judicata
15 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959) (quoting Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
16 See, e.g., David L. Shapiro & Daniel R. Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil
Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV. 442, 454 (1971) (“[I]t . . . seems
appropriate to consider more broadly whether the courts and commentators of [the Fram-
ers’] day perceived a link between the existing limitations on res judicata and the jury trial
right.”).
17 See, e.g., In re Margaret Mastny Revocable Trust, 794 N.W.2d 700, 708 (Neb. 2011)
(stating that the application of res judicata is a question of law); Mullins v. State, 294
S.W.3d 529, 535 (Tenn. 2009) (same); Lemond v. State, 180 P.3d 829, 832 (Wash. Ct. App.
2008) (same); see also 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 1258 (2009) (“The application of the doctrines
of res judicata and collateral estoppel is a question of law.” (footnotes omitted)). Addition-
ally, a minority of courts view res judicata as a mixed question of law and fact but still
choose to give the matter to the judge. See, e.g., Redrock Valley Ranch, LLC v. Washoe
Cnty., 254 P.3d 641, 647 (Nev. 2011) (holding that the application of res judicata is a
mixed question of law and fact for the tribunal); Okla. Natural Gas, Inc. v. Messer, 249
P.3d 99, 104 (Okla. Civ. App. Ct. 2010) (same); In re P.D.D., 256 S.W.3d 834, 842 (Tex.
App. Ct. 2008) (same); see also 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 641 (2006) (“[S]ome courts have
decided that the availability of collateral estoppel judgment presents a mixed question of
law and fact.”).
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has the ability to drastically alter the course of litigation, and may
sometimes result in the dismissal of a case entirely, courts have estab-
lished detailed procedures for determining when judges may apply
this doctrine in order to ensure that it is not executed indiscrimi-
nately.  Although courts have the power to raise res judicata sua sponte,
they rarely do so.18  Instead, it is typically left to the interested party to
invoke res judicata.19  While there are small variations between differ-
ent courts regarding the requirements for applying res judicata, most
courts have developed substantively similar doctrines that mirror
those found in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments.20
A. Claim Preclusion
For claim preclusion to apply, three elements must be found: (1)
the claim in the second action must be identical to the claim in the
first action; (2) the claim in the first action must have been a final
judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion; and (3) the parties in the second action must be the same as, or
in privity with, the parties in the first action.21  Although the applica-
tion of claim preclusion might appear simple based on these three
requirements, there are a number of exceptions that complicate the
doctrine.22
One such exception involves litigants splitting their claims.  Gen-
erally, the claim preclusion doctrine prevents a party from splitting a
single claim into two separate actions; however, courts permit parties
to circumvent this prohibition if there was an agreement in the initial
18 See ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS
THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 237 (2001).
19 Id.  While the requirements for applying res judicata are mostly uniform, the
method by which it is invoked still varies.  Courts throughout the country employ a variety
of methods to invoke res judicata such as by motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or specially pleaded affirmative defense.
See id. at 238–41.  Some courts even allow parties to invoke issue preclusion, without special
pleadings or a motion, by asserting it as they would assert evidence at a trial. See id. at
241–42.
20 See, e.g., Elia v. Pifer, 977 P.2d 796, 803 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (deciding to follow the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments “[b]ecause no Arizona case law holding defines ‘final judg-
ment[ ]’ for collateral estoppel purposes”); Danner v. Zaineb, Inc., No. Cv040104390S,
2005 WL 469171, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 2005) (“Connecticut generally follows
the principles of res judicata as stated in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments.”); Kest-
erson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Mo. 2008) (“Missouri cases
discussing claim preclusion generally follow the Restatement [(Second)] of Judgments.”).
21 See, e.g., Ross ex rel. Ross v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 211, 486 F.3d 279,
283 (7th Cir. 2007); Richards v. Graham, 801 N.W.2d 821, 824 n.2 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011); see
also Brownewell, supra note 6, at 882–83. R
22 Examples of claim preclusion exceptions include: when an adjudication is not on
the merits, when granting claim preclusion would conflict with substantive policy, or when
a jurisdictional or procedural limitation prevented the barred party from asserting a partic-
ular legal argument in the first action. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 18, at 85–105. R
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action through which both parties consented to splitting the claim.23
Another exception states that if a defendant misled a plaintiff by false
representation or concealment, which caused the plaintiff to sue on
less than the entire claim in the first action, the court will not permit
the defendant to rely on claim preclusion should the plaintiff sue on
the remainder of the claim in a second action.24  Determining
whether parties had a prior agreement or whether a defendant made
a misrepresentation are fact-bound inquiries concerning disputed is-
sues of fact; yet, judges are given the reigns to decide these questions
because they fall under res judicata’s “question of law” umbrella.
B. Issue Preclusion
A party invoking issue preclusion must meet the following re-
quirements: (1) the issue in the second action must be identical to an
issue in the first action; (2) the issue in the first action must have been
actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment; (3)
the issue in the first action must have been essential to the judgment;
and (4) the party against whom preclusion is sought must have had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate in the first action.25  In addition to
these basic requirements, there are a number of exceptions, similar to
claim preclusion, that prevent courts from precluding an issue.26
One of issue preclusion’s more recent exceptions pertains to the
problem of unforeseeability.  This exception states that, in extraordi-
nary circumstances, a court will not apply issue preclusion against a
party if: (1) the application of such preclusion was unforeseeable at
the time of the first action, and (2) such unforeseeability affected the
level of effort expended in the first action.27  This exception becomes
especially relevant in the following paradigm situation: a party litigates
an issue in an initial action that has very small stakes, devoting little
effort to the litigation; but later, in a second action with extremely
high stakes, the opposing party attempts to use the issue litigated and
resolved in the first action against the party from the first action.28
23 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 (1982).
24 See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 18, at 104. R
25 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); see also Brownewell, supra
note 6, at 883–84. R
26 Examples of issue preclusion exceptions include: lack of ability to appeal the first
judgment, difference in burden of persuasion between trials, and judgment from an infer-
ior court in the prior trial. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 (1982).
27 See id. § 28(5)(b); CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 18, at 139. R
28 Judge Learned Hand foresaw such a problem in Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927
(2d Cir. 1944).  There, Judge Hand wrote:
What jural relevance facts may acquire in the future it is often impossible
even remotely to anticipate.  Were the law to be recast, it would . . . be a
pertinent inquiry whether the conclusiveness . . . of facts decided in the first
[suit] might not properly be limited to future controversies which could be
thought reasonably in prospect when the first suit was tried. . . .   Logical
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Some courts have sought to protect the first party in the paradigm
scenario by explicitly stating that it must have been foreseeable that
the issue sought to be precluded would be of significance in future
litigation.29  But how is the court to determine what was foreseeably
important in the first action?  The court will most likely have to ex-
amine evidence independent of the first action’s record and possibly
question witnesses in order to determine the outlook of the party and
what could have been foreseeable.  This is yet another example of a
factual inquiry falling to the court as a question of law.
Perhaps the most “factual” of all res judicata’s requirements is
that the party against whom preclusion is sought must have had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue or claim in the first action.30
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides several examples where a
party may not have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate: “[O]ne
party may conceal from the other information that would materially
affect the outcome of the case. . . .  Or one of the parties may have
been laboring under a mental or physical disability that impeded ef-
fective litigation and that has since been removed.”31  These examples
display the inherently factual element of this inquiry.  If the plaintiff
alleges that the defendant concealed information in the first trial, and
the defendant claims that the information was not concealed but
rather only recently became available, the result is a disputed issue of
fact that should go to the jury.  However, despite the factual nature of
the full and fair opportunity requirement, present law dictates that a
judge will be the final adjudicator of any factual disputes that arise
under this inquiry.32
When deciding whether to apply res judicata, judges rely on the
formal record of judgment from the first action; however, it is often
the case that judges will use extrinsic evidence beyond the record as
well.33  Such evidence is broadly admissible under the rules of evi-
dence in most jurisdictions.34  When analyzing the parties’ extrinsic
relevance is of infinite possibility; there is no conceivable limit which can be
put to it.  Defeat in one suit might entail results beyond all calculation by
either party; a trivial controversy might bring utter disaster in its train.
Id. at 929.
29 See e.g., Hyman v. Regenstein, 258 F.2d 502, 511 (5th Cir. 1958) (“[C]ollateral es-
toppel by judgment is applicable only when . . . it was foreseeable that the fact would be of
importance in possible future litigation.” (footnote omitted)).
30 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(5)(c) (1982) (identifying the lack
of “an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication” as a circum-
stance that qualifies for an exception to the general rule of issue preclusion).
31 Id. § 28 cmt. j (1982).
32 See, e.g., Colonial Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Anderson, 588 N.W.2d 531, 533 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999) (ruling that a party cannot invoke res judicata when a litigant’s brain injury “likely”
prevented him from having a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the first action).
33 See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 18, at 243. R
34 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS §§ 19 cmt. h, 27 cmt. f, 77 (1982).
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evidence, which often supports opposing conclusions, the judge must
decide whose evidence is more persuasive.  Thus, when determining
the applicability of res judicata, judges examine evidence in order to
ascertain the truth in the parties’ factual dispute—a strange result, as
resolution of these types of factual disputes is the precise reason for
the jury’s existence in civil trials.  Moreover, establishment of a judi-
cial role in making such factual determinations directly conflicts with
hundreds of years of jurisprudence regarding the role of the jury in
deciding questions of fact.
II
THE HISTORY OF THE FACT-LAW DISTINCTION
For many centuries, the black-letter rule of the common law has
been that judges decide questions of law and juries decide questions
of fact.35  The Seventh Amendment provides that:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.36
While the Seventh Amendment does not explicitly demarcate the fact-
law distinction, the Supreme Court has historically assumed that “the
jury’s primary function is to decide questions of fact, while judges may
permissibly decide questions of law.”37  Generally speaking, state
courts have come to the same conclusion when interpreting their con-
stitutions.38  Indeed, American jury-right jurisprudence has a long his-
tory of implicitly accepting this fact-law distinction.39  However, after
35 See RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE 1393
(10th ed. 2010).
36 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
37 Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Questions of Fact Under the Seventh Amend-
ment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1125, 1127–28 (2003) (footnote omitted); see Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958) (“An essential characteristic of [the federal]
system is the manner in which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions
between judge and jury and, under the influence—if not the command—of the Seventh
Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury.” (footnote
omitted) (citation omitted)); Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Essay, The Myth of the
Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1780 (2003) (“[T]he Seventh Amendment
relies on the law-fact distinction to demarcate decision-making authority.  Namely, the
amendment provides a bright-line constitutional mandate: if an issue is factual and falls
within the scope of the amendment, then it must be submitted to a jury . . . .”).
38 New York serves as an excellent representative for individual states’ interpretation
of their jury right.  Similar to the U.S. Constitution, New York’s constitution guarantees the
right to “trial by jury,” N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2, and its high court has accepted that the jury
will decide questions of fact while the judge will decide questions of law. See, e.g., People  v.
Bennett, 49 N.Y. 137, 147 (1872) (“[I]t was a question of fact for the jury, and not of law
for the court . . . .”).
39 See Biglin, supra note 11, at 146. See generally Allen & Pardo, supra note 37, at 1769 R
(“[The fact-law distinction] is the legal system’s fundamental and critical distinction.”).
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the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Markman v. Westview Instru-
ments, Inc.,40 the Court has begun to look beyond the fact-law distinc-
tion when allocating decision-making responsibility.41  Because the
Seventh Amendment is not binding on the states, state courts have
mostly continued to follow the fact-law distinction rather than adopt
the Court’s approach in Markman.42  In fact, several states have chosen
to supplement their constitutions by writing statutes that explicitly re-
quire “issues of fact” to be tried by a jury.43  Accordingly, Part II of this
Note will focus primarily on how the Supreme Court has reinter-
preted the federal jury right through its modern Seventh Amendment
jurisprudence.
A. Pre-Markman Support for Allocating Questions of Fact to the
Jury
Courts must answer two questions to determine the extent of a
jury’s involvement in a case: (1) Does the plaintiff have a cause of
action that triggers the jury right?  (2) If the jury right does exist,
which questions go to the jury and which go to the judge?44  To an-
swer the first question, courts look to whether the plaintiff’s cause of
action was tried at law or equity at the time of the adoption of the
Seventh Amendment in 1791.45  When answering the second ques-
tion, courts have historically adhered to the old common law mantra
that questions of fact go to the jury and questions of law go to the
judge.46  Support for the fact-law distinction dictating this separation
40 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
41 See id. at 388–90 (engaging in historical analysis, looking to precedent, and taking
into account “functional considerations” when determining whether a judge or jury should
interpret patent claims).
42 See Joshua D. Stadtler, Note, Ortiz Got It Wrong: Why the Seventh Amendment Does Not
Protect the Right to Jury Trial in Class Actions Suits Under FRCP 23, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1561, 1592
(2010).
43 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-215 (1958) (“All issues of fact in any such case shall
be tried by the jury . . . .”); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4101 (Consol. 2012) (“In the following actions,
the issues of fact shall be tried by a jury unless a jury trial is waived . . . .”).
44 Joan E. Schaffner, The Seventh Amendment Right to Civil Jury Trial: The Supreme Court
Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away, 31 U. BALT. L. REV. 225, 235 (2002).
45 See Kirgis, supra note 37, at 1127.  The two-part analysis to determine the jury’s role R
in a trial is often referred to as the “historical test,” and it inhabits an interesting place in
American jurisprudence in that it is “widely criticized but entrenched.” Id.  The criticism
goes to both extremes as some scholars maintain that looking to history is entirely unneces-
sary, see, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 33, 74–76, while others believe courts should apply an even more strict
historical approach, see, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Essay, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitu-
tional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 142–43 (2007).
46 See Schaffner, supra note 44, at 241–42. See generally Ellen E. Sward, The Seventh R
Amendment and the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 587 (2003) (“Defin-
ing the right in this manner is consistent with English practice, where the law/fact distinc-
tion was the principle means of allocating decision-making authority between judge and
jury.”).
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of decision-making duties can be found in various places.  For exam-
ple, the Seventh Amendment explicitly refers to “facts” in its second
clause47 and, although this clause does not expressly allocate ques-
tions of fact to the jury, “it suggests that questions of fact [are] under-
stood to be peculiarly the jury’s province.”48  There are also various
legislative enactments that lend support to the fact-law distinction.49
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Court has issued
many opinions affirming the jury’s role in deciding questions of fact.50
In a famous 1958 case, the Court wrote that “under the influence—if
not the command—of the Seventh Amendment, [the federal system]
assigns the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury.”51  How-
ever, after Markman and its progeny, the Court began to look beyond
the fact-law distinction when deciding whether a jury should decide a
particular question.
B. Markman and Its Progeny
Since the Supreme Court decided Markman in 1996, the opinion
has become indispensable in determining the role of judges and juries
under the Seventh Amendment.  The central issue in the case was
whether patent claim construction was a matter for the judge or
jury.52  In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that patent claim con-
47 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined
in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.” (em-
phasis added)).
48 Kirgis, supra note 37, at 1133. R
49 The Judiciary Act enacted by the first Congress, which preceded the ratification of
the Seventh Amendment, provides that “the trial of issues in fact[ ] in the district courts . . .
shall be by jury.”  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, sec. 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77.  Modern enactments
also confirm the allocation of questions of fact to the jury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1872 (2006) (“In
all original actions at law in the Supreme Court against citizens of the United States, issues
of fact shall be tried by a jury.”).  Even the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make reference
to this allocation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 38(c) (stating that when one party requests a jury trial
on only a fraction of the issues in the case, the other party may demand a jury trial on “all
factual issues triable by jury”).
50 See, e.g., Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931) (“All of
vital significance in trial by jury is that issues of fact be submitted for determination . . . by
the jury . . . .”); Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920) (“The limitation imposed by the
[Seventh] Amendment is merely that enjoyment of the right of trial by jury be not ob-
structed, and that the ultimate determination of issues of fact by the jury be not interfered
with.”).
51 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
52 When a patent is filed, it includes one or more “claims” which “particularly point[ ]
out and distinctly claim[ ] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).  The claim “defines the scope” of a patent grant and is used by
courts to determine whether another party has infringed upon the patent. See Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372–74 (1996).  At trial, the judicial actor who
constructs the patent claim often must determine what particular words in the patent
mean.  In Markman, part of the patent dispute hinged on the meaning of the word “inven-
tory.” See id. at 375.
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struction was a question of law for the judge.53  The Court based its
analysis on the two-question inquiry stated above.  The Court quickly
dispensed with the first question by stating that the case required a
jury trial because patent infringement actions were tried at law in
1791.54  It is the second question that occupies the bulk of the Court’s
opinion.
In answering the second question concerning which particular
issues should go to the judge or jury, the Court asked itself “whether
the particular trial decision must fall to the jury in order to preserve
the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 1791.”55  Histor-
ically, the Court has linked the “substance of the common-law right”
to the resolution of factual disputes by the jury;56 however, in this
case, the Court separated the substance of the right from the question
of fact discussion.57  Instead, the Court determined the substance of
the common law right by looking to history, precedent, and other
functional considerations.58  Looking to history to determine which
judicial actor should construct patent claims required the Court to
examine American and English case law starting from approximately
1791—the year the United States adopted the Seventh Amendment.59
Unfortunately, this search was inconclusive as the Court quickly deter-
mined that nothing closely resembling claim construction appeared
during the 1700s.60  Next, the Court considered existing precedent,
which proved inconsequential to the present action because such
precedents addressed product identification rather than claim con-
struction.61  Unable to unearth an answer in the previous two areas,
the Court focused its analysis on functional considerations.  The
Court acknowledged the “highly technical” nature of patents and
noted that “[t]he construction of written instruments is one of those
things that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors un-
burdened by training in exegesis.”62  Because the question at hand fell
53 See id. at 390.
54 See id. at 377.
55 Id. at 376.
56 See Walker v. N. M. & S. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) (stating that the aim of
the Seventh Amendment is to preserve “substance of right,” which “requires that questions
of fact in common law actions . . . be settled by a jury, and that the court shall not assume
directly or indirectly to take from the jury or to itself such prerogative.”); see also Gasoline
Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931) (“All of vital significance in trial
by jury is that issues of fact be submitted for determination . . . by the jury . . . .”).
57 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 378.
58 Id. at 388 (“Where history and precedent provide no clear answers, functional con-
siderations also play their part in the choice between judge and jury to define terms of
art.”).
59 See id. at 378–81.
60 See id. at 378–79.
61 See id. at 386–88.
62 Id. at 388–89.
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“somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical
fact,” the Court placed increased emphasis on which “judicial actor
[was] better positioned than [the other] to decide the issue in ques-
tion.”63  Ultimately, the Court concluded that patent claim construc-
tion was a matter fit for the judge, not the jury.64
The Markman decision produced an immense scholarly reaction,
much of it harshly critical of the Court’s decision.65  In the spirit of
redemption, the Court availed itself of the opportunity to revisit the
contentious issue just a few years later in City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.66  There, the Court faced the issue of whether a
judge or jury should decide a regulatory takings claim.67  In its jury
instruction, the trial judge stated that the jury should find for Del
Monte Dunes “if it found either that Del Monte Dunes had been de-
nied all economically viable use of its property or that the city’s deci-
sion to reject the plaintiff’s 190 unit development proposal did not
substantially advance a legitimate public purpose.”68  The jury found
for Del Monte Dunes, and the City of Monterey appealed to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court, claiming
that the judge should have been the judicial actor to decide the tak-
ings claim.69
63 Id. at 388 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104,
114 (1985)).
64 See id. at 390.  In the final paragraphs of the Markman opinion, the Court briefly
spoke of “the importance of uniformity” in the treatment of patent claim construction. See
id. Indeed, the court saw uniformity as an independent reason to designate claim con-
struction a question for the judge, believing that having judges settle these questions would
result in greater uniformity. See id.  The underlying rationale being that a judge is more
likely to have of a more accurate interpretation of patent claims than a jury.  This rationale
has received strong criticism from commentators. See, e.g., Greg J. Michelson, Note, Did the
Markman Court Ignore Fact, Substance, and the Spirit of the Consitution in its Rush Toward Uni-
formity?, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1749, 1775 (1997) (“The notion that a single judge is capable
of understanding that which would confuse and mislead the combined wisdom of twelve
lay jurors is paternalistic and should be rejected.”).  Interestingly, several studies have
shown that reversal rates for patent claim construction cases have actually increased since
Markman. See, e.g. Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231 (2005); David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal
Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073 (2010).  Thus, the Court’s decision did not create more
uniformity in patent claim construction.
65 See, e.g., John R. Lane & Christine A. Pepe, Living Before, Through, and with
Markman: Claim Construction as a Matter of Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 59 (2001) (dis-
cussing how Markman created strategic ramifications for the parties and legal decision-
making complications for the courts); David B. Pieper, The Appropriate Judicial Actor for Pat-
ent Interpretation: A Commentary on the Supreme Court’s Decision in Markman v. Westview Instru-
ments, Inc., 51 ARK. L. REV. 159, 175–79 (1998) (discussing problems associated with
declaring claim interpretation a matter of law, including judges’ lack of specialized skill,
lack of finality in decisions, and reduction of the right of trial by jury).
66 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
67 See id. at 707.
68 Id. at 700 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
69 See id. at 701–02.
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The Court employed the analytical structure established in
Markman, first exhausting the dual investigative avenues of history and
precedent, which proved inconclusive.70  Thus, the decision would
turn on the Court’s examination of functional considerations.  How-
ever, in contrast to Markman, the Court’s functional analysis focused
predominantly on the fact-law distinction.  The court stated that “[i]n
actions at law[,] predominantly factual issues are in most cases allo-
cated to the jury” and that takings claims are “essentially ad hoc, fac-
tual inquiries requiring complex factual assessments of the purposes
and economic effects of government actions.”71  With specific regard
to the question of whether the City of Monterey’s decision to reject
the development proposal substantially advanced a legitimate public
interest, the Court pronounced that the question begat a mixture of
law and fact that was so “essentially fact-bound [in] nature” that it
must go to the jury.72 Del Monte Dunes, while following Markman’s ana-
lytical framework, re-emphasized the importance of the fact-law dis-
tinction by placing the focus of the analysis on the factual content of the
question rather than the judicial actor best positioned to answer the
question.73  The case seemed to create a spectrum with questions of
fact at one end and questions of law at the other; resolution of a par-
ticular question by either judge or jury thus depends on the question’s
proximity to either of the spectrum’s endpoints.
III
THE APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA FROM THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY TO MODERN TIMES
Res judicata involves both state and federal law because the court
trying the second action must apply the res judicata law of the render-
ing court.74  For example, if an Iowa state court rendered the first
decision and the defendant sought to use issue preclusion as a de-
fense in a second trial in California state court, then California would
have to apply Iowa’s res judicata law.  Because it would be too cumber-
some to catalogue every court’s res judicata law, this Note aims to ex-
70 See id. at 718–20.
71 Id. at 720 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
72 Id. at 721(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
73 See Kirgis, supra note 37, at 1142–43. R
74 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 86–87 (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 95 cmt. e (1971); see also City of Chicago v. St. John’s United
Church of Christ, 935 N.E.2d 1158, 1168 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (stating that the res judicata
law of the rendering court determines the applicability of res judicata in the subsequent
court); Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 591 A.2d 592, 598 (N.J. 1991) (“In
general, the binding effect of a judgment is determined by the law of the jurisdiction that
rendered it.” (citation omitted)).
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amine a range of states and the federal courts in order to provide a
well-rounded picture of how res judicata application operates.
The courts of nineteenth-century America treated res judicata
much differently than do modern courts.  In the 1800s, the jury was
the judicial actor that determined whether a former judgment pre-
cluded an issue or claim.75
However, after the turn of the century, there was a shift in the
application of res judicata as a growing number of judges began to
decide res judicata issues themselves as a matter of law.  By the second
half of the twentieth century, it was nearly universally held that the
application of res judicata was a question of law for the judge.76  Be-
cause nothing has been written on this shift from question of fact to
question of law, this migration must be examined through the pri-
mary case law.
A. Res Judicata Cases of the Nineteenth Century and the
Migration to Question of Law
As discussed in Part I, there are many scenarios in which res judi-
cata application involves factual determinations.77  Whenever dis-
puted issues of fact arise, state and federal jury-right jurisprudence
dictate that the matter should go to the jury for resolution.78  Indeed,
most of the res judicata cases of the nineteenth century did exactly
that.79  For example, in James v. Lawrenceburgh Insurance Co., the plain-
tiff sued the defendant to recover debt on a promissory note, and the
defendant claimed that the plaintiff had already recovered this debt in
a former action.80  The trial court submitted to the jury the issue of
whether the two debts were identical, an action that the Supreme
Court of Indiana upheld.81  The court stated that if a plaintiff re-
sponds to a defendant’s res judicata defense by contending that the
present and former causes of action are not identical, then the jury
75 See, e.g., Packet Co. v. Sickles, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 580, 593–94 (1866) (stating that the
jury should be the judicial actor to settle factual disputes involving extrinsic evidence when
determining the applicability of res judicata); James v. Lawrenceburgh Ins. Co., 6 Blackf.
525, 526 (Ind. 1843) (“If to a plea of former recovery, the plaintiff reply that the causes of
action are not the same, the issue is for a jury.”); Amsden v. Dubuque & Sioux City R.R., 32
Iowa 288, 292 (1871) (holding that it is the role of the jury to determine whether the
identity of the former and present causes of action are the same); Finley v. Hanbest, 30 Pa.
190, 193–94 (1858) (stating that whether the causes of action were identical is a question
for the jury); Crotzer v. Russell, 9 Serg. & Rawle 81, 83 (Pa. 1822) (explaining that when
parol evidence is needed to determine whether a matter had been tried and previously
decided between the same parties, it is a question for the jury).
76 See supra note 14. R
77 See supra Part I.
78 See supra Part II.
79 See id.
80 See 6 Blackf. 525, 526–27 (Ind. 1843).
81 Id.
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must be the judicial actor to resolve the issue.82  This was a common
holding for many nineteenth century courts;83 even the Supreme
Court of the United States evinced a similar opinion in Packet Co. v.
Sickles.  In Packet Co., the Court stated that there is a right to have a
jury settle factual discrepancies involving extrinsic evidence when par-
ties use such evidence to establish which issues were actually decided
in a previous action.84  The Court went on to suggest that the preclu-
sion question should be submitted to the jury and tried alongside all
the other evidence involving the merits.85  Courts would then instruct
the jury that if it found that a former judgment precluded a particular
issue, then it need not proceed to the merits of that issue; however, if
the jury found there was no preclusion, it would proceed to the
merits.86
As the turn of the century approached, courts began to rethink
the jury’s role in the application of res judicata.  Without issuing deci-
sions explicitly moving res judicata from a question of fact to a ques-
tion of law, courts gradually modified their res judicata doctrines in a
manner diminishing the jury’s role, slowly facilitating the shift from a
question of fact to one of law.  With both issue and claim preclusion,
courts throughout the country began to rule that it was the judge’s
prerogative to determine res judicata’s applicability.87  In the second
half of the twentieth century, nearly every state and federal court
agreed that application of res judicata was a question of law for the
judge to determine.88  Cases in which the litigants were entitled to a
trial by jury regarding an issue of fact involving res judicata became
nearly nonexistent.89
Interestingly, despite calling res judicata a “question of law,”
courts in many twentieth-century cases still fully acknowledged that
they were making factual determinations when deciding the applica-
82 Id.
83 See supra note 75. R
84 72 U.S. 580, 593–94 (1866).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Compare Hempstead v. City of Des Moines, 3 N.W. 123, 127 (Iowa 1879) (“It was the
province of the court [in a res judicata matter] to determine what issues are involved in
each case and what matter was decided in the chancery action.”), with Amsden v. Dubuque
& Sioux City R.R., 32 Iowa 288, 292 (1871) (holding that it is the role of the jury to deter-
mine whether the identity of the former and present causes of action are the same).
88 See supra note 14. R
89 Although these types of cases are extremely rare, they did not disappear com-
pletely. See Hanna v. Riggs, 333 So.2d 563, 566 (Ala. 1976); Walz v. Agric. Ins. Co. of
Watertown, N.Y., 282 F. 646, 649 (E.D. Mich. 1922); Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Barn-
house, 293 S.W.2d 261, 266 (Tex. 1956).  The impact of these cases, however, was limited
as the courts did not follow the logic of these decisions in subsequent cases.
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bility of res judicata.90  For example, in Hoy v. Jackson, the court dis-
cussed how conflicting evidence on an issue of fact must be resolved
by proceeding to trial; however, the court went on to say that “the fact
issues germane to a res judicata/collateral estoppel issue are deter-
mined by the court, not the jury.”91  Presently, even though the re-
quirements of res judicata remain nearly identical to those of the
nineteenth century, it is the province of the court to settle factual dis-
crepancies involving the application of res judicata.
B. Lacking a Legal Justification for Holding Res Judicata
Application as a Question of Law
Curiously, res judicata’s migration from question of fact to ques-
tion of law occurred without the courts supplying any explicit legal
justification or overruling cases.  Instead, courts gradually usurped the
jury’s decision-making role over time.  Even today, examination of
modern res judicata and jury-right jurisprudence reveals no legal justi-
fication for having the court decide factual disputes involving the ap-
plication of res judicata.
1. Res Judicata Jurisprudence
Exploration of various courts’ res judicata case law reveals that
almost all of the nineteenth-century cases holding that factual dis-
putes involving res judicata are for the jury have not been overturned.
Consider the Supreme Court of Iowa: the court recently stated that
“[w]hether the elements of issue preclusion are satisfied is a question
of law.”92  When determining the applicability of issue preclusion,
Iowa’s first requirement is that “the issue concluded must be identi-
cal.”93  However, in an 1871 case, the court held that when a party
pleads a former adjudication as res judicata, “[t]he identity of the
causes of action is a question of fact, to be determined by the jury
90 See, e.g., Del Mar Avionics v. Quinton Instruments Co., 645 F.2d 832, 835 (9th Cir.
1981) (“Whether a nonparty controlled the earlier litigation is a question of fact for the
trial court.” (citation omitted)); Vulcan, Inc. v. Fordees Corp., 658 F.2d 1106, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1981) (stating that for the purposes of determining the applicability of res judicata,
“[w]hether privity exists in a given case is a question of fact”); MetraHealth Ins. Co. v.
Drake, 68 F. Supp. 2d 752, 758 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (“The determination of whether a party’s
interests were ‘virtually’ or adequately represented in a previous suit is one of fact to be
decided by the court.” (citation omitted)); Stone v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 744 So. 2d 141, 143
(La. Ct. App. 1999) (“[W]hat matters were ‘actually litigated’ and decided in a prior action
. . . is a factual question [for the court].” (citation omitted)); DeLisle v. Avallone, 874 P.2d
1266, 1269 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (“The sufficiency of a nonparty’s control over litigation
[for purposes of issue preclusion] is a question of fact.” (citations omitted)); Hoy v. Jack-
son, 554 P.2d 561, 562 & n.4 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (en banc).
91 554 P.2d at 562 & n.4 (citation omitted).
92 Grant v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 722 N.W.2d 169, 173 (Iowa 2006) (citations
omitted).
93 Id. at 174 (quoting Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 709 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Iowa 2006)).
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upon the evidence adduced.  It is not the province of the court to
withdraw such question from the jury, by an instruction or upon mo-
tion of a party.”94  Interestingly, Iowa has no case explicitly stating that
the court is moving this query from a question of fact to a question of
law.  Rather, the court simply began stating in a matter-of-fact manner
that res judicata was a matter to be decided by the court.95  Other
states have a very similar history wherein their courts hold res judicata
as a question of law but provide no justification for the annexation of
the jury’s decision-making role.  This is very surprising, as these courts
have taken away one of the most fundamental constitutional rights for
litigants: to have a jury hear disputed issues of fact.
Federal courts similarly hold res judicata as a question of law.96
However, as previously discussed, the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Packet Co. stated that it is the jury’s duty to settle discrepancies in the
extrinsic evidence when parties use such evidence to establish what
issues were actually decided in a former action.97  To date, although
this part of the Court’s opinion in Packet Co. has been practically for-
gotten, the Court has not overruled it.  Thus, litigants attempting to
use federal judgments to preclude an issue or claim in a second adju-
dication retain the right to have a jury resolve any factual disparities in
the extrinsic evidence.98  Any court that denies such a right directly
violates Supreme Court precedent.
2. Federal Jury-Right Jurisprudence
Although the Supreme Court’s Seventh Amendment jurispru-
dence forges several paths by which judges may make factual determi-
nations, this jurisprudence provides no justification for depriving the
jury of the ability to resolve factual discrepancies involving res judi-
cata.  As discussed in Part II, courts must answer two questions to de-
termine the extent of the jury’s involvement in a case: (1) Does the
plaintiff have a cause of action that triggers the jury right?  (2) If the
jury right does exist, which questions go to the jury and which go to
the judge?99  Because res judicata is a legal defense, rather than an
equitable defense, courts tried res judicata at law at the time of the
94 Amsden v. Dubuque & Sioux City R.R., 32 Iowa 288, 292 (1871) (citation omitted).
95 See supra note 75. R
96 See, e.g., In re Antonakis, 207 B.R. 201, 204 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1997) (“[T]he availa-
bility of issue preclusion [under federal law] in a particular case is a question of law, [and]
the decision whether to apply the doctrine is vested in the trial court’s discretion.” (cita-
tions omitted)).
97 See 72 U.S. 580, 593–94 (1866).
98 Regardless of whether a party is in state or federal court, “[f]ederal law governs the
preclusive effects of a federal judgment.”  Stone v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 744 So.2d 141, 142
(La. Ct. App. 1999).  Thus, Packet Co. controls factual disputes involving res judicata’s appli-
cation to federal judgments.
99 See supra Part II.A.
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Seventh Amendment’s adoption.100  Thus, res judicata triggers the
jury right.
After triggering the jury right, one must determine which ques-
tions go to the judge and which go to the jury.  Even when using the
post-Markman approach of looking beyond the fact-law distinction, the
jury must still be the one who resolves factual discrepancies involving
res judicata.  When deciding whether a question should go to the
judge or jury, the Markman court examined three areas: history, prece-
dent, and functional considerations.101  When looking to history, one
must examine whether the particular question was given to the judge
or jury at the time of the Seventh Amendment’s adoption.  A survey of
case law starting from approximately 1791—when the United States
adopted the Seventh Amendment—reveals that the jury was responsi-
ble for determining whether a former judgment would preclude a
later claim.102  The Court intended the inquiry to end at the historical
analysis if there was “clear historical evidence” of leaving a particular
question for the jury;103 however, given the variability of historical re-
search and for the sake of this Note, precedent and functional consid-
erations will be examined as well.
Similar to the inquiry the Court in Markman conducted, looking
to precedent for an answer to this question provides no clear gui-
dance because many courts make blanket statements that res judicata
is a “question of law” and have supporting precedent maintaining that
factual disputes concerning res judicata must go to the jury.104  Such
holdings hardly provide the clarity courts require in order to provide
an answer to this question.  Even the Supreme Court itself still has
good case law stating that courts must submit res judicata’s factual
discrepancies involving extrinsic evidence to the jury.105  Thus, look-
ing to existing precedent does not provide an answer as to whether
the judge or the jury should resolve these types of factual disputes.
The focus of the present analysis now turns to functional consid-
erations in order to determine whether factual disputes concerning
100 See Richard C. Gaskins, Jr. & Shawn F. Sullivan, New Clean Air Act Enforcement Provi-
sions and the Defense of Enforcement Actions, 10 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 39, 61 (1995); see also
Windsor Square Homeowners Ass’n v. Citation Homes, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 818, 824 (Cal. App.
Ct. 1997) (“[R]es judicata . . . is a legal and not an equitable defense . . . .”).
101 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376, 384, 388 (1996).
102 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Fairman, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 458, 460 (N.C. 1797) (“[T]he defen-
dant pleaded amongst other things, a former judgment.  The jury found a former judg-
ment recovered at Wilmington not yet satisfied.” (emphasis added)).
103 Markman, 517 U.S. at 377; see also James M. Patrick, Preserving the Right to a Jury Trial
in Public Employee Free Speech Litigation: The Protected Status of Speech Must Be Labeled a Mixed
Question of Law and Fact, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 375, 384 (2010) (stating that the fact that
discovering courts historically gave a question to the jury could be a “decisive factor” in the
Markman analysis).
104 See supra Part III.B.1.
105 See Packet Co. v. Sickles, 72 U.S. 580, 593–94 (1866).
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res judicata must go to the judge or jury.  The Supreme Court has
only analyzed these types of functional considerations in two cases:
Markman and Del Monte Dunes.106  These two cases approach func-
tional considerations differently and thus must be analyzed indepen-
dently.  In Markman’s functional considerations analysis, the Court
conducted a holistic inquiry that primarily focused on which judicial
actor was better suited to handle patent claim construction.107  The
Court decided judges were better positioned to construct patent
claims because such claims involve “highly technical” information and
“construction of written instruments is one of those things that judges
often do and are likely to do better than jurors.”108  One might make
the argument that such reasoning could be applied to res judicata
disputes; however, this argument cannot prevail.  Unlike the “highly
technical” patent claim construction in Markman, res judicata disputes
can involve the entire gamut of legal matters—from the elementary to
the complex.  Although decision making concerning the applicability
of res judicata may involve legal terminology and documents, it is
hardly any different than relying on a jury to hear evidence involving a
basic contract.  It would simply be too large of a leap to equate the
scientific data present in patent claims to every possible res judicata
dispute that might arise.  To allow this argument to succeed would
encourage a slippery slope whereby a judge could take any question
deemed “highly technical” from the jury.
Markman’s other justification for giving patent claim construction
to judges was that judges are typically better at construing written in-
struments.109  While res judicata does require one to look to the previ-
ous record to determine what was litigated in the first proceeding,
disputed issues of fact involving res judicata do not arise solely from
this inquiry.  Judges’ skill in construing written instruments does not
justify permitting them to determine whether a party had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate in the first action, whether the parties had
an unspoken agreement about claim splitting, whether the current
parties were in privity with the former parties of the first action, or
whether future litigation was unforeseeable at the time of the first ad-
judication.  In short, it would be unjust to allow judges to decide res
106 For a further analysis of both Markman and Del Monte Dunes, see supra Part II.
107 Markman, 517 U.S. at 388–89.
108 Id. at 388.  Some scholars are critical of moving a question of fact to a question of
law based on which judicial actor is better positioned to answer a given question. See e.g.,
Allen & Pardo, supra note 37, at 1783 (“Perhaps judges are better fact-finders in commer- R
cial litigation—because of complexity, their knowledge of the Code or commercial prac-
tices, or the desire for uniformity and predictability—but this does not make ‘legal’ issues
out of factual issues . . . .”).
109 See 517 U.S. at 388.
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judicata disputes based on a skill that applies only to a small portion of
the entire res judicata inquiry.110
In Del Monte Dunes, decided three years after Markman, the Court
held that the jury should be the judicial actor to decide takings
claims.111  The Court approached the functional considerations analy-
sis in a different manner than in Markman, placing heavy emphasis on
the fact-law distinction rather than on the judicial actor best qualified
to answer the question.  The Court held that a takings claim, which
involves assessing whether a landowner has been deprived of “all eco-
nomically viable use” of the property in question, is a mixed question
of law and fact that is so “essentially fact-bound in nature”112 that the
jury must decide the issue.  It seems as if the Court envisioned a spec-
trum with questions of fact at one end and questions of law at the
other, giving the takings question to the jury because it was closer to
the “fact” end.  One scholar has gone so far as to suggest that after Del
Monte Dunes, the functional considerations analysis does no more than
enshrine the fact-law distinction.113
Following the Court’s functional considerations logic in Del Monte
Dunes, res judicata disputes would likely go to the jury for resolution.
Similar to a takings inquiry, a res judicata dispute is a matter that
mixes fact and law.  Although res judicata contains legal aspects, it is
fundamentally a factual inquiry and thus lies closer to the “fact” side
of the Del Monte Dunes spectrum.114  There are two types of questions
typically assigned to juries as “questions of fact”: “(1) determining
what happened, that is, what the parties did and what the circum-
stances were; and (2) evaluating those facts in terms of their legal con-
sequences, for instance, whether the conduct of the defendant in the
circumstances was not that of a reasonable person.”115  Res judicata’s
requirements and exceptions occupy both of these categories; exam-
ples include: determining what matters were actually litigated in the
110 The Markman case also cited the importance of uniformity as an independent rea-
son for assigning patent claim construction to the judge. See id. at 390.  However, this
rationale is inapplicable to res judicata disputes.  Even if one were to temporarily accept
Markman’s rationale that judges are more suited to handle complex technical questions for
the sake of uniformity, res judicata’s factual disputes do not involve highly technical issues.
Applying Markman’s uniformity rationale to res judicata would be similar to allocating all
contractual disputes—or really any kind of factual dispute—to judges simply to attain
greater uniformity in the courts.  There is a constitutional right to have a jury hear factual
disputes and this cannot be discarded anytime it appears that a judge could come to a
decision with greater predictability.
111 See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes of Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 694
(1999).
112 Id. at 720–21.
113 See Kirgis, supra note 37, at 1143. R
114 For cases stating the factual components of res judicata, see supra note 90. R
115 FIELD ET AL., supra note 35, at 1393 (quoting Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 R
(1992)).
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previous action, whether the parties had an agreement about claim
splitting in the former adjudication, and whether one issue is identical
to another issue.  These inquiries do not require application of a legal
principle to a set of facts; instead, it is the facts themselves that are in
dispute and need to be resolved.  Thus, res judicata is closer to the
“question of fact” side of the Del Monte Dunes spectrum, and courts
should give these matters to the jury.
Further, it is likely that the Del Monte Dunes analysis would be
more suited to res judicata disputes than the Markman analysis.  Al-
though the Court in Del Monte Dunes stated that the takings claim in-
volved “complex factual assessments,” the Court did not mention
Markman’s reasoning of giving highly technical information to the
judge.116  This suggests that the Court may have intended Markman to
be limited specifically to patent claims.  Indeed, the Markman Court
stated that they need not consider “whether [the] conclusion that the
Seventh Amendment does not require terms of art in patent claims to
be submitted to the jury supports a similar result in other types of
cases.”117  Regardless of Markman’s possible patent limitations, it is
clear that Del Monte Dunes reemphasized the fact-law distinction that
Markman had diminished.118  Additionally, while Markman seems to
have been a deviation from the Court’s Seventh Amendment jurispru-
dence, the returned significance of the fact–law distinction in Del
Monte Dunes represents a more natural progression of the Court’s pre-
vious cases on the subject.119
Although the Seventh Amendment and its case law are not bind-
ing on the states, “[f]ederal jury law sometimes applies of its own force
in state court.”120  That being said, state courts have been wary to
adopt the reformed jury-right framework conceived by the Supreme
Court in Markman.  However, some state courts possess reasoning very
similar to the Del Monte Dunes spectrum concerning mixed questions
of law and fact.  Unable to fit certain questions squarely as questions
of law or questions of fact, these courts answer the judge or jury ques-
tion based on whether legal or factual issues predominate.121  Thus,
while state courts do not possess the same framework of looking to
116 See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 720.
117 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 383–84 n.9 (1996).
118 See Kirgis, supra note 37, at 1143. R
119 See supra Part II.A.
120 FIELD ET AL., supra note 35, at 1510. R
121 See, e.g., McKinney v. State, 640 So.2d 1183, 1184 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994) (“[T]he status
of Lakeland Christian School is a mixed question of fact and law in which the legal issues
predominate.”); Redrock Valley Ranch, LLC v. Washoe Cnty., 254 P.3d 641, 647 (Nev.
2011) (“The availability of issue preclusion is a mixed question of law and fact[ ] in which
legal issues predominate and, [o]nce it is determined [to be] available, the actual decision
to apply it is left to the decision of the tribunal in which it is invoked.” (alterations in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)).
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history, precedent, and functional considerations, some of them do
decide which judicial actor will decide an issue based on whether it is
more similar to a factual or a legal inquiry—resembling the Del Monte
Dunes spectrum.
C. Modern Application of Res Judicata
By the second half of the twentieth century, the application of res
judicata in America had become largely uniform.  It is nearly impossi-
ble to find a court today that holds res judicata disputes as questions
of fact; instead, the vast majority of courts find res judicata to be a
question of law.122  Although these courts are similar in that they all
give res judicata disputes to the judge, they differ considerably in the
way they perceive this “question of law.”  Some courts view res judicata
as a pure question of law without any substantive factual compo-
nent.123  Others fully acknowledge the factual component of res judi-
cata but still give the question to the judge.124  Even when making
statements such as, “what matters were ‘actually litigated’ and decided
in a prior action . . . is a factual question,” these courts bypass the jury
and let the judge decide any factual discrepancies concerning res judi-
cata.125  Despite this overwhelming dissolution of the jury right, there
were several cases in the second half of the twentieth century that gave
res judicata disputes to the jury.126  In Hanna v. Riggs, the Supreme
Court of Alabama held that “where a former judgment is set up as a
bar and there is a factual dispute as to whether there is such an iden-
tity of parties, subject matter or cause of action as will support the
plea, this question of fact is one for the jury.”127  Although decided in
1976, Hanna gets authority for its holding from cases from the 1920s
and 1930s, when many states were still forming their res judicata doc-
trine.128  Despite never being overruled, Hanna has not been followed
122 See supra note 17. R
123 See, e.g., Prusky v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 502 F. Supp. 2d 422, 427 n.9 (E.D. Pa.
2007) (“[R]es judicata and/or collateral estoppel, turn not on questions of fact, but on
pure questions of law.” (emphasis added)); see also Global Oceanic Enters. v. Hynum, 857
So. 2d 659, 661 (Miss. 2003) (“[R]es judicata is a legal rather than a factual
determination.”).
124 See supra note 90. R
125 Stone v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 744 So. 2d 141, 143 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
126 See supra note 89. R
127 Hanna v. Riggs, 333 So. 2d 563, 566 (Ala. 1976).
128 Id.; see Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Burks, 121 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Ark. 1938) (holding that the
issue of whether the parties had previously agreed to a “covenant against suit,” which con-
trolled whether the case was barred by res judicata, was one for the jury); Dolby v. Whaley,
197 A. 161, 167 (Del. 1938) (“[I]t was for [the jury] to decide whether the Justice had
determined precisely the same issue involved in this case on that petition.”); Poehl v. Cin-
cinnati Traction Co., 151 N.E. 806, 808 (Ohio 1925) ([T]he question should have been
submitted to the jury as to whether or not the . . . judgment . . . recovered from the city of
Cincinnati [in a prior preceding] was full compensation for [alleged] loss and injury.”).
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by any Alabama case, and, as of today, Alabama courts hold res judi-
cata as a question of law.129
There are some courts that proclaim res judicata is a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact and give the issue to the judge because they be-
lieve it is a question where legal issues predominate—similar to being
closer to the “law” end of the Del Monte Dunes spectrum.130  The Cali-
fornia courts, in contrast to courts that hold res judicata as a mixed
question, are unique in that they represent one of the only jurisdic-
tions to explicitly declare that there is no right to a jury trial on a res
judicata defense.131  While other courts implicitly say the same thing
by giving the question to the judge, California does not tiptoe around
its res judicata doctrine and makes its holding very clear.  In Windsor
Square Homeowners Association v. Citation Homes, the court held that
when a party attempts to use res judicata as a defense, a court may
bifurcate the trial and try the res judicata issue without a jury, even
where disputed facts underlie the defense.132  The court rationalized
its decision by stating that res judicata often involves questions of fact
and law, and “[w]hile all [res judicata] issues may have factual predi-
cates, they are peculiarly legal determinations.”133  However, the court
did not provide any reasoning for why res judicata is more legal than
factual other than saying that res judicata issues are “often mixed fact-
law determinations, involving, for instance, the assertion of jurisdic-
tion, a decision better made by the court alone.”134  The court seemed
to forget that a party may use res judicata for any fact from a former
adjudication, not simply one pertaining to legal matters such as juris-
diction.  Strangely, the court went on to admit that “the facts that
need to be determined [in res judicata disputes] are fairly simple” and
that the authority it relies on for its holding “assumes, without much
analytical discussion, that such factual issues are naturally tried to the
court.”135  Even the California Practice Guide deems this doctrine “ques-
129 See Walker v. Blackwell, 800 So. 2d 582, 587 (Ala. 2001); Watkins v. Harper, 984 So.
2d 472, 474 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007).
130 See, e.g., Redrock Valley Ranch, LLC v. Washoe Cnty., 254 P.3d 641, 647 (Nev. 2011)
(“The availability of issue preclusion is a mixed question of law and fact[ ] in which legal
issues predominate and, once it is determined [to be] available, the actual decision to
apply it is left to the discretion of the tribunal in which it is invoked.” (alteration in origi-
nal) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Sutton, 103
P.3d 8, 16 (Nev. 2004)); rsc Quality Measurement Co. v. IPSOS–ASI, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d
609, 619 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (“[W]hether a claim is barred by res judicata presents a mixed
question of law and fact in which legal issues predominate.” (citations omitted)).
131 See Windsor Square Homeowners Assoc. v. Citation Homes, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 818,
824–25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
132 See id. at 824–25; see also WILLIAM E. WEGNER ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE:
CIVIL TRIALS & EVIDENCE ch. 2-C, 2:92.20 (2011).
133 Windsor Square, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 825.
134 Id. at 824.
135 Id. at 824–25.
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tionable” and goes on to state that a defendant “has a constitutional
right to a jury trial on any disputed facts involved in the defense.”136
Thus, the court’s circular reasoning is insufficient to justify declaring
res judicata as “peculiarly legal” and giving all res judicata disputes to
the court.  Rather, res judicata is primarily an investigation into dis-
puted facts,137 and courts must submit res judicata’s factual disputes to
the jury.
IV
RES JUDICATA AS A PRELIMINARY SCREENING QUESTION
Although the right to a trial by jury has been a hallmark of the
American judicial system for centuries,138 a few caveats have emerged
over the years that allow courts to determine disputed issues of fact
without implicating the Seventh Amendment.  One scholar refers to
this phenomenon as the “judicial screening function,” where “[j]uries
are simply not eligible to decide the many procedural and preliminary
questions that arise prior to and during trial.”139  These questions go
to the judge not because of their content but because of their func-
tion.  As long as the judge’s decision regulates the manner in which
parties present an issue for determination by the jury, the judge may
decide these questions as a matter of law.140  The two examples of this
doctrine are facts pertaining to the admission of evidence (hence-
forth, “evidentiary facts”) and jurisdictional facts.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2) provide
for motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; defendants may use
them to dispute the facts alleged by plaintiffs to invoke the court’s
jurisdiction.141  When a defendant uses these motions, factual disputes
may arise concerning matters such as “whether a long-arm statute is
satisfied, whether process has been adequately served, whether the re-
quirement of diversity is satisfied, and whether a federal statute might
govern the ultimate disposition of the case.”142  When disputes con-
cerning jurisdictional facts develop, judges often hold preliminary
hearings and examine extrinsic evidence in order to settle the dis-
136 WILLIAM F. RYLAARSDAM, ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL PROCEDURE
BEFORE TRIAL, Ch. 12(I)-D, 12:292.1 (2011).
137 For a more detailed discussion of the factual component of determining the appli-
cability of res judicata, see supra Part III.B.2.
138 See William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 68 (2006) (“The jury is, after all, one of two defining features of our
legal system.  Nearly all civil jury trials and ninety percent of criminal jury trials on the
planet take place in the United States.” (footnotes omitted)).
139 Kirgis, supra note 37, at 1145. R
140 See id. at 1146.
141 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)–(2).
142 Kirgis, supra note 37, at 1147 (footnotes omitted). R
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putes themselves as a matter of law.143  However, the Supreme Court
has created an important exception to this rule: judges may not de-
cide jurisdictional facts when such facts are “intertwined with the mer-
its” of the cause of action.144  This exception serves to protect the
Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial for causes of action at
law.145
Similar to jurisdictional facts, judges may also settle some dis-
puted issues of fact concerning the admissibility of evidence.  Federal
Rule of Evidence 104 and some of its state-law analogues, such as Cali-
fornia Evidence Code sections 403 and 405, permit a judge to have a
preliminary hearing, take extrinsic evidence, and decide “those ques-
tions of fact conditioning the admissibility of evidence upon a finding
of fact as a necessary foundation to satisfy a rule of law.”146  These
evidentiary questions often include matters involving the exclusion of
such items as privileged information, hearsay, and character evi-
dence.147  Although these types of determinations involve settling dis-
puted facts, the jury plays no role in the decision-making process.
However, in order to protect the Seventh Amendment’s right to trial
by jury, this rule contains an exception similar to that in jurisdictional
facts:
When the preliminary fact question and the ultimate question for
the jury to resolve on the merits are the same, there is a seeming
dilemma if the judge were to resolve the question of fact in such a
way that the case would come to an end.  Hence, to promote the
value of trial by jury, many courts . . . exhibit[ ] strong reluctance to
allow the orthodox rule to operate.148
Courts label these types of evidentiary and jurisdictional decisions
as “questions of law” more so as a matter of convenience than as a
counterpoint to a “questions of fact.”  Courts fully acknowledge that
these are fundamentally factual decisions but choose to label them as
questions of law simply to note that judges, not juries, make these de-
terminations.149  It is important to emphasize that these are special-
143 See Stefania A. Di Trolio, Note, Undermining and Unintwining: The Right to a Jury Trial
and Rule 12(b)(1), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1247, 1247, 1257–60 (2003).
144 See Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735–39 (1947) (holding that when jurisdiction
turns on the merits, courts require a trial by jury on the merits); Di Trolio, supra note 143, R
at 1259.
145 See Di Trolio, supra note 143, at 1266 (asserting that the “intertwined with the mer- R
its” exception “polices the application of Rule 12(b)(1) to ensure that the right to a jury
trial is preserved” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
146 Norman M. Garland, An Essay On: Of Judges and Juries Revisited in the Context of Cer-
tain Preliminary Fact Questions Determining the Admissibility of Evidence Under Federal and Califor-
nia Rules of Evidence, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 853, 854 (2008).
147 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404 (character); FED. R. EVID. 501–02 (privilege); FED. R.
EVID. 801–07 (hearsay).
148 Garland, supra note 146, at 860. R
149 See Kirgis, supra note 37, at 1146. R
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ized questions unrepresentative of the true distinction between
questions of law and questions of fact.  Although courts have never
explicitly included res judicata in the judicial screening function cate-
gory, it is plausible to make the argument that the judicial screening
function’s logic justifies holding res judicata as a question of law; how-
ever, such an argument cannot succeed for several reasons.
The first reason is that judges’ ability to decide jurisdictional and
evidentiary questions comes explicitly from the legislature, and legisla-
tures have simply not stated that judges are the judicial actors who
should decide res judicata disputes.  For example, both the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly
grant judges the power to decide jurisdictional facts and some eviden-
tiary facts without a jury;150 there is no such analogue for res judicata.
In fact, the text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) explicitly lists
res judicata as an affirmative defense, not as a pretrial matter for the
judge.151
The second and primary reason that the judicial screening doc-
trine cannot apply to res judicata is that factual disputes concerning
res judicata go more to the merits of a case whereas jurisdictional and
evidentiary facts are procedural.  Jurisdictional facts are procedural
because they determine whether a party even has the right to enter
the court.  Evidentiary facts are similarly procedural in that they con-
trol the presentation of evidence to the ultimate fact finder.  By con-
trast, res judicata goes directly to the merits of the case and is seen as
an affirmative defense rather than a pretrial procedural inquiry for the
judge.  As a point of comparison, the following are defenses that Rule
8(c) lists in addition to res judicata: assumption of the risk, contribu-
tory negligence, duress, fraud, and statute of limitations.152  These de-
fenses, including res judicata, go to the merits of the case by
presenting new information for the jury to consider in order to accu-
rately determine whether a party should prevail.  For example, if a
plaintiff alleges that a defendant owes him $500, and a defendant
counters that the plaintiff was already paid $500 by the defendant in
another lawsuit, then the defendant is attacking the merits of the
plaintiff’s argument, not any type of procedure.  Whereas jurisdic-
tional and evidentiary facts are specifically designed to avoid the mer-
its, res judicata is specifically designed to attack the merits.
150 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(i) (“If a party so moves, any defense listed in Rule
12(b)(1)–(7)—whether made in a pleading or by motion—and a motion under Rule
12(c) must be heard and decided before trial unless the court orders a deferral until
trial.”); FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question about
whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible.”).
151 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
152 See id.
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Moreover, the primary fear that arises from allowing judges to
resolve jurisdictional and evidentiary facts is that the judge might
reach matters ultimately intended for the jury or make a decision that
effectively brings the case to an end.153  Granting judges the power to
settle factual res judicata disputes brings both these fears to fruition.
For example, a judge might determine that an important issue de-
serves preclusion after making a factual determination that the party
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the first adjudication.
This single issue could be a controlling factor that determines the out-
come of a case.  These fears are especially pronounced when judges
make factual determinations regarding claim preclusion, which allows
judges to conclude the entire case with one decision.  Thus, res judi-
cata facts may not be placed within the judge’s judicial screening func-
tion.  Rather, juries must be the judicial actor to settle res judicata
disputes.
V
A PROPOSAL FOR HOW TO SETTLE RES JUDICATA DISPUTES
The modern application of res judicata violates the right to a jury
that every litigant in the United States possesses.  In order to comply
with the Seventh Amendment and state constitutions, modern courts
must modify their res judicata doctrines so that any factual disputes
concerning res judicata go to the jury.  What follows is a proposed
procedure allowing courts to preserve judicial economy while simulta-
neously protecting the right to have a jury hear res judicata disputes.
When a party submits a defense of claim or issue preclusion, the court
must first determine whether there are any disputed material facts re-
lated to the defense that would prevent the matter from being re-
solved on the pleadings or by summary judgment.154  If the parties
present no disputed material facts, the court may settle the dispute by
summary judgment; however, if there are disputed material facts, the
court may not resolve the factual disputes itself and must instead sub-
mit the defense to a jury.  When a party attempts to use claim preclu-
sion, it would be prudent for a court to bifurcate the trial and try the
claim preclusion matter independently.  After the jury hears the dis-
puted facts regarding the application of claim preclusion, the trial
may take one of two paths: (1) if the jury finds that the claim is pre-
cluded, then the trial ends; (2) if the jury finds the claim is not pre-
153 See supra notes 144, 148 and accompanying text. R
154 Courts typically dispose of modern res judicata disputes by a judgment on the
pleadings or summary judgment, so this step should not deviate too far from modern trial
procedure. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 18, at 237.  Instead, this proposal intends to R
limit judges’ findings of preclusion to instances where both parties do not dispute any
factual components.
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cluded, then the case will move ahead and be tried on the merits.
Because of the narrow scope of the bifurcated trial, it would most
often proceed quickly and not waste judicial resources as greatly as
some might fear.  In fact, this approach is substantially similar to that
already used in California,155 but instead of having the court be the
fact finder in the bifurcated trial, the parties have the right to have a
jury decide whether the matter is precluded.
Similar to claim preclusion, when a litigant attempts to use issue
preclusion, a court may choose to use the bifurcation approach dis-
cussed above.  The scope of the bifurcated trial will often be even nar-
rower than with claim preclusion and would likely proceed more
speedily.  As an alternative, courts may wish to adopt the approach
suggested by the Supreme Court in Packet Co..  There, the Court sug-
gested that the preclusion question should be tried together with all
the other evidence bearing on the issues so that the jury may decide
on the merits in the event that it rejects the claim of preclusion.156
This approach eliminates the need for bifurcation and uses the jury
already selected for the case on the merits to review the preclusion
question as well.  By using the trial’s existing momentum of already
having a jury in place, judicial resources receive little additional strain
because the parties would only need to tack on a few additional dis-
putes.  However, the Supreme Court’s suggested approach does carry
negative aspects as well.  First, the jury’s exposure to the merits of the
issue is likely to influence its decision when answering preclusion
questions.157  Second, this approach would result in parties in the sec-
ond action arguing that the issue was actually decided in the first adju-
dication and arguing the issue on the merits.  Parties would likely fear
that if the jury decided the issue was not precluded, they would be at
an enormous disadvantage if they did not exert enough effort in argu-
ing the issue on the merits.  Thus, in the long run, this approach
would actually be more detrimental to judicial economy than the bi-
furcation option because parties would litigate on the merits and on
res judicata in order to cover any possible contingencies.  Accordingly,
bifurcation is the best option for courts to protect the jury right and
preserve judicial economy.158
The practical implications of adopting the above proposal would
have important consequences in the modern judicial system.  Prima-
rily, courts would have to call upon juries more frequently, or desig-
155 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. R
156 See 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4420 (2d
ed. 2002) (discussing Packet Co. v. Sickles, 72 U.S. 580, 593–94 (1866)).
157 See id. (“Moreover, it is no insult to the jury to suggest that its resolution of the
preclusion question is apt to be influenced strongly by its exposure to the merits.”).
158 See id. (“If there is to be jury trial of the issue-preclusion question, it should be set
ahead of trial on the merits.”).
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nate the judge as finder of fact, in order to settle disputes that
previously were handled as matters of law.  Such a shift could result in
more expensive and longer-lasting litigation, but this is a small price
to pay for protecting such an important constitutional right.  In fact,
the founding fathers cited the denial of the right to a jury trial in the
Declaration of Independence as among the reasons for America’s re-
bellion against England.159  Some might argue that this proposal mili-
tates against res judicata’s goal of preventing repetitive litigation and
promoting judicial economy; however, it is important to remember
that the true purpose of res judicata is not simply to save the court’s
time but to prevent a matter previously decided from being tried
again.160  And surely courts should not condone the sacrificing of con-
stitutional rights merely to save some time.  Indeed, the Supreme
Court previously stated that the benefits to judicial economy created
by res judicata were an “insufficient basis for departing from our long-
standing commitment to preserving a litigant’s right to a jury trial.”161
Although this proposal of having juries decide res judicata dis-
putes might seem alarming, it does not change the requirements of
proving res judicata nor give litigants an extra “bite at the apple;”
rather, it only changes the judicial actor who hears such disputes.  Par-
ties must still face the same hurdles that have guarded res judicata for
years, only now they have the right to have a jury hear their arguments
rather than only a judge.  This proposal does not allow juries to reex-
amine the merits of previously decided disputes or determine whether
the first court decided the matter correctly; instead, the jury will only
determine whether a past issue was actually decided in a previous adju-
dication.  For centuries, the United States Constitution and the consti-
tutions of individual states have placed their trust in the jury to
ascertain the truth in factual disputes.  In turn, the jury must be per-
mitted to exercise this duty, enshrined in confidence, to resolve res
judicata disputes.
CONCLUSION
When the application of res judicata involves factual disputes, the
jury must be the judicial actor to resolve these discrepancies.  The fact-
law distinction, which gives questions of fact to the jury and questions
of law to the judge, has guided American courts for hundreds of
years.162  From the time of the adoption of the Seventh Amendment
until the end of the nineteenth century, courts have viewed res judi-
159 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776) (accusing King George
III of “depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury”).
160 See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 16 (2001).
161 Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554 (1990).
162 See supra Part II.
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cata disputes as factual determinations within the province of the
jury.163  The migration from question of fact to question of law in the
twentieth century lacked any proffered legal justification, and even as
the courts proclaimed res judicata as distinctively within the judge’s
dominion, they still acknowledged the factual nature of the res judi-
cata inquiry.164  Even the judicial screening doctrine and modern Sev-
enth Amendment jurisprudence cannot justify holding res judicata as
a question of law.  Thus, although state and federal courts hold res
judicata as a question of law, there is no legal justification for doing
so.  By trying the preclusion claim separately in a bifurcated trial,
courts protect litigants’ constitutional right to a jury trial.  One judge
has been so bold as to state that “[t]he most stunning and successful
experiment in direct popular sovereignty in all history is the American
jury.”165  Accordingly, any curtailment of the jury’s role in trial litiga-
tion should not occur without a valid, robust legal justification.
163 See supra Part III.A.
164 See supra Part III.B.
165 Young, supra note 138, at 69. R
